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The safety and health standards of the Occupational Safety and Health Act [OSHA] do not 
specifically address life safety in chemical plants, other than requiring owners and operators to 
“provide a safe place to work” and to ensure that “employees may evacuate the workplace 
safely”.  NFPA 101 would classify chemical plants as high-hazard industrial occupancies, and a 
primary concern is to ensure “minimal danger to occupants in case of fire or other emergency 
before they have time to use exits to escape”.  NFPA 1 also requires that the design and 
operation of buildings and facilities “provide an environment for the occupants that is reasonably 
safe from fire and similar emergencies, for the amount of time needed to evacuate”.   Thus, most 
life-safety requirements are concerned with safe exit. 
 
There are, however, other life-safety hazards that should be of concern to chemical plant owners 
and operators.  They include many single-exit locations, such as the upper levels on 
distillation/fractionation columns, scrubbers, and other tall equipment; elevated work platforms 
as atop multi-story buildings and smokestacks; platforms above tank cars, tank trucks, and 
hopper cars; at the head of bucket elevators; work spaces above false ceilings; and ladder-access 
roofs over operating areas.  Also, chemical-plant life-safety hazards include flash fire [flammable 
vapors and combustible dusts]; releases of toxic gases and vapors; and vessel rupture from 
runaway reaction or other causes of overpressure.  This paper presents practical countermeasures 




The Williams-Steiger Act of 1970 [Reference 1] established the Occupational Safety and Health 
standards, and it included the statement that a purpose of this Act was to “provide for the general 
welfare, to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and 
healthful working conditions.” 
 
The accompanying “General Duty” clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act [Reference 
2] provides the following requirement for “life safety”: 
 
Each employer shall furnish to each of his employees . . . . . a place of employment which [is] 
free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical 
harm to his employees. 
 
The primary source for life-safety requirements is the “Life Safety Code” of the National Fire 
Protection Association, as NFPA 101 [Reference 3].  The purpose of this Code is “to provide 
minimum requirements, with due regard to function, for the design, operation, and maintenance 
of buildings and structures for safety to life [emphasis added] from fire” and to “aid life safety in 
similar emergencies.”  An additional statement is that a goal of this Code is to “provide life 
safety during emergencies that can be mitigated using methods comparable to those used in case 
of fire.”  Further, emergencies would include “incidents where the hazard involves thermal 
attributes similar to fires or airborne contaminants similar to smoke, and explosions and 
hazardous material releases.”  However, “the Code recognizes that features mandated by this 
Code might be less effective against such hazards than against fires.” 
 
Thus, many of the requirements and guidance that are provided in this Code can aid in the design 
of chemical-plant facilities and structures.  Foremost in the requirements of the Life Safety Code 
is assurance that occupants of a structure are to be able to exit from the structure to a safe 




The Safety and Health Standards of the Occupational Safety and Health Act [OSHA] address 
several limited [and non-quantitative] aspects of exits, as follows: 
 
• Employers must provide exit routes so that employees may evacuate the 
workplace safely during an emergency [Reference 4]. 
 
• Maintenance, safeguards, and operational features for exit routes protect and 
minimize the danger to employees during emergency egress [Reference 5].  
 
This “Means of Egress” section of the OSHA Standards [Reference 6] refers to the “Life Safety 
Code” of the National Fire Protection Association and to the International Fire Code [Reference 
7].  However, the “quantitative” requirements of these Codes are not included in the OSHA 
Standards.  Guidance concerning emergency-warning times, travel distances, travel times, and 
the design of escape routes are presented in the following sections, together with the 
justifications for rapid escape in an emergency. 
 
Types of Life-Safety Hazards in Chemical Plants 
 
There are wide varieties of life-safety [fatality] hazards in many chemical plants.  They can 
include the following, in an approximate descending order of risk [Reference 8]: 
 
•       Fire hazards, as exposure to thermal radiation, engulfment in flame, or inhalation of 
            smoke or combustion gases 
• Exposure to toxic gases or vapors, toxic or corrosive liquids, and toxic dusts 
• Exposure to oxygen-depleted atmospheres, with risk of asphyxiation 
• Suffocation from engulfment in powders, or drowning in liquids 
• Explosion hazards, as exposure to blast effects, shrapnel, or structural collapse 
• Exposure to the above hazards while entrapped in single-exit situations or circumstances 
 
There are many types of chemical processes that can lead to one or more of the above hazards.  
Loss of containment of hazardous materials or loss of control of processes often can lead to 
release of flammable, explosible, or toxic materials.  Ideally, a Process Hazards Analysis [PHA] 
or Risk Assessment [RA] can identify the causes of such incidents and lead to correction of the 
causes. 
 
There may be other life-safety hazards and, although they are important concerns of safety and 
health managers, they are not within the scope of this presentation: 
 
 Industrial-type hazards of slipping, tripping, falling from elevations, and dropped loads 
 Hazards of impact, crushing, or other trauma in powered equipment 
 Incidents involving lift trucks, delivery and product trucks, automobiles, and other vehicles 
 Exposures to earthquakes, landslides, or weather events such as tornadoes, hail, and flooding 
 Incidents involving sabotage, severe process upsets from cyber[netic] attack, terrorism, or 
gunfire 
 
Employers have a “general duty” to protect employees from all of the above hazards, 
particularly if they had been previously recognized as life-safety hazards [Reference 2].  If a 
“pro-active” analysis of processes and equipment had been performed, with identification of 
hazards, the employer must take steps to prevent exposure to the identified hazard or mitigate 
the likely consequences of the hazard [Reference 9].  
 
Types of Life-Safety Process Hazards Requiring Emergency Escape 
 
There are many types of materials [and energies] that are used in chemical plants that can cause 
injuries to employees unless they are carefully controlled and managed.  These hazards include 
the following: 
 
 1.  Explosions: 
  
• Ruptures of equipment from overpressure, as from un-relieved runaway reaction, 
internal explosion of thermally-unstable material, fire exposure, or other source of 
internal pressure; 
 
• Ignition of flammable gases, vapors, or dusts, as confined in equipment, rooms, or 
other enclosures; 
 
• Initiation of explosives or other unstable materials, from sparks, heat, or impact.   
 
Such incidents may occur without sufficient warning of a need to evacuate the area, and travel 
distances and travel times are likely to exceed the limits of life-safety codes and standards, 
because of the explosion-damaged environment.  However, the ability of employees to escape 
from such an environment should be the subject of process-hazard and process-risk assessments, 




• Pool fires, from ignition of spilled flammable liquid; 
 
• Flash fires, from ignition of accumulated flammable vapor in process vessels, 
equipment, in rooms, or other enclosures; 
 
• Jet fires, from ignition of flammable liquid or vapor issuing at high pressure from 
piping or equipment. 
 
In many of these incidents, there are forewarnings such as flammable gas/vapor alarms, and 
visual or audible indications of releases.  Also, it may be possible to escape from the thermal 
radiation of fires by moving away from the fire, or by seeking refuge in the “shadow” of walls 
or equipment, or by moving into a “place of safety”. 
 
 3.        Toxic-Material Releases: 
 
• Release of toxic gases or vapors from equipment, storage tanks, or other containers; 
 
• Release and dispersal of toxic dusts from bags, drums, dust collectors, conveyors, or 
other equipment; 
 
• Release and vaporization of toxic liquids as spills from equipment or storage 
containers. 
 
• Release of toxic combustion gases and unburned dusts, vapors, and aerosols from 
explosion vents. 
 
• Release of toxic decomposition or reaction products – including liquids, vapors, and 
gases – from overpressure-protection relief valves 
 
As with fire hazards, there may be forewarnings such as toxic-gas/vapor alarms, and visual, 
audible, or odor indications of releases.  Also, it may be possible to escape from toxic releases 
by traveling cross-wind from the release point, or by leaving the enclosed areas in which a 




 4.         Stored Energy: 
 
• Release of potential or kinetic energy from powered equipment that is spring, 
pneumatic, or hydraulic-powered, and could cause serious and traumatic injury to 
personnel. 
 
• Exposure to high-voltage and/or high-energy electrical sources that can result in 
serious or fatal injury. 
 
As with explosions, these hazards may occur without warning.  Life-safety codes and standards 
do not address travel distances and travel times for these types of stored-energy hazards.  
However, the OSHA standards require ready access to medical assistance.    
 
Thus, life-safety concerns in chemical plants should address escape to a safe location 
particularly (1) during a fire event or (2) during a toxic-release event, and also (3) following an 
explosion or energy-release event. These consequences of undesired events should be included 
as process hazards in evaluations of new or modified processes and in the periodic re-
evaluations to determine if such hazards are adequately controlled. 
 
This presentation does not directly involve Process Hazards Analyses or Risk Assessments and, 
instead, focusses on the physical aspects of the plant and its structures.  Also, the “post-trauma” 
care of persons who were injured by the above events – with first-aid or medical treatment – is 
certainly important but is not within the scope of this presentation.  
 
Guidance Provided by the “Life Safety Code”, NFPA 101 
 
The most-important reference for the protection of employees, contractors, and visitors to a 
chemical plant is the “Life Safety Code” of the National Fire Protection Association [NFPA], 
which is published as NFPA 101 [Reference 3].  The pertinent section is Chapter 40, “Industrial 
Occupancies”, but this Chapter also refers to Chapter 3, “Definitions”; Chapter 4, “General 
Requirements”; Chapter 6, “Classification of Occupancy and Hazard of Contents”; Chapter 7, 
“Means of Egress”; and Chapter 8, “Features of Fire Protection“. 
 
Although much of the guidance that is presented in NFPA 101 is directed toward protection of 
personnel from fire, several aspects of this Code would also apply to protection against releases 
of toxic materials.  Less guidance is provided for escape from explosion-damaged structures or 
from the environment in which equipment has suffered an explosion.  No guidance is given in 
NFPA 101 for escape from an environment where a sudden release of energy had occurred. 
 
          Classification of Chemical Plants 
 
                    High-Hazard Occupancies 
 
Almost all chemical plants would be considered to be “High Hazard” occupancies because of 
the presence of hazards like those that are described above.  In the “Life Safety Code, high-
hazard industrial occupancies include industrial occupancies that use high-hazard materials or 
processes or house high-hazard contents [Reference 10].  
 
The high-hazard materials would include: 
 
• Gasoline and other flammable liquids where possible release of flammable vapors could 
occur; 
• Grain dust, wood flour or plastic dust, aluminum or magnesium dust, or other explosible 
dusts; 
• Explosives storage and handling; 
• Combustible flyings or fibrous materials. 
There is a limited exception that might apply to some locations in a chemical plant.  A “special-
purpose” industrial occupancy would be an area having a low density of personnel and with 
much of the area occupied by machinery or equipment.  The scope of this paper does not 
include “special-purpose” occupancies except where there is only one exit from that area.  
 
“Ordinary-Hazard Occupancies” represent the conditions found in most buildings and is the 
basis for the general requirements of the Life Safety Code, where there would be no unduly 
dangerous exposure to toxic fire gases during the period necessary to escape from a fire area, 
assuming there are proper exits [Reference 11].  
 
The “Life Safety Code” does not provide a definition of “Low-Hazard Occupancy”, except as 
the storage of non-combustible materials, with some combustible materials or hazardous 
operations during building repair or maintenance [Reference 12]. 
 
Guidance Provided by the International Building Code 
 
As stated in the Intent paragraph of this Code [Reference 13], “The purpose of this code is to 
establish the minimum requirements to safeguard the public health, safety and general welfare 
through structural strength, means of egress facilities,  . . . and safety to life and property from 
fire and other hazards . . .  and to provide safety to fire fighters and emergency responders 
during emergency operations.” 
 
In the International Building Code [IBC], high-hazard occupancies are defined as structures that 
involve materials that constitute a physical or health hazard in quantities that exceed the 
“Maximum Allowable Quantity per Control Area” [Reference 14].  A Control Area is defined 
as a space that is enclosed by wall, fire barriers, and roofs where hazardous materials are stored, 
dispensed, used, or handled.  Tables are provided in the IBC for a wide variety of materials with 
physical [fire and explosion] hazards or health [toxicity] hazards, with limits for storage and for 
use in closed or open systems. The following Table 1 presents examples of the Maximum 
















Combustible Dust Special Report Special Report H-2 
Class IA Liquid 30 gallons 10 gallons H2 or H-3 
Class IB or IC Liquid 120 gallons 30 gallons H-2 or H-3 
Class II Liquid 120 gallons 30 gallons H-2 or H-3 
Class IIIA Liquid 330 gallons 80 gallons H-2 or H-3 
Class IIIB Liquid 13,200 gallons 3,300 gallons Not H 
Flammable Gas 1,000 std. cu. ft. Not Applicable H-2 




Corrosive Liquid 150 gallons 100 gallons H-4 
Corrosive Gas 810 std. cu. ft. Not Applicable H-4 
Toxic Liquid 150 gallons 125 gallons H-4 
Toxic Gas 801 std. cu. ft. Not Applicable H-4 
Highly-Toxic Liquid 4 gallons 3 gallons H-4 
Highly-Toxic Gas 20 std. cu. ft. Not Applicable H-4 
 
There are several additional types of Physical Hazard materials, and the above quantities can be 
doubled if used in sprinkler-protected structures or if – for example – contained in approved 
cabinets, exhaust-ventilated enclosures, or safety cans.  Thus, the IBC should be consulted to 
determine the allowable quantities per control area and the appropriate Group classification if 
the maximum quantity were to be exceeded. 
 
Ordinary or Moderate-Hazard Occupancies would be “Factory Industrial F-1 Moderate Hazard 
Occupancy” [Reference 16].  This classification would include all types of occupancies that are 
not “Low-Hazard Occupancies” nor “High-Hazard Occupancies”.  The examples that are cited 
in the IBC include the following manufacturing operations which might be considered to be 
chemical facilities: 
 
• Beverages, over 12-percent alcohol 
• Disinfectants 
• Food processing 
• Paper mills and products 
• Plastic products 
• Soaps and detergents 
• Wood distillation 
 
Other chemical plants that would be classified as ordinary-hazard or moderate-hazard 
occupancies would involve “processing, assembly, mixing, packaging, finishing, decorating, or 
repair” [Reference 17].  This definition would include the use of ordinary combustible materials 
such as finished plastics items, liquids that are non-combustible or have high flash points, 
powders that are non-combustible or have very large particle sizes, and packaging materials.  
This definition would exclude processes that involve exothermic reactions, flammable and 
unstable chemicals, combustible powders and dusts, and other “high-hazard contents”, 
including the handling and storage of such materials.   
 
“Low-Hazard Occupancy” is defined in the International Building Code as “F-2 Factory 
Industrial” and involves “the fabrication or manufacturing of noncombustible materials which, 
during finishing, packing, or processing, do not involve a significant fire hazard” [Reference 
18].  The examples that are cited include non-alcoholic beverages, brick and masonry 




High-hazard occupancies also would include structures in which “High-Hazard Contents” are 
handled.  The definitions of “High-Hazard Contents” in the NFPA “Life Safety Code” would 
include the following [Reference 19]: 
 
• Materials that are likely to burn with extreme rapidity or from which explosions are 
likely, including flammable liquids; combustible agricultural, plastic, metal, and other 
explosible dusts; and other products of manufacture [Reference 20]. 
 
• Materials that generate dangerous smoke or gases, potentially endangering the lives and 
safety of the occupants of the building or structure [Reference 21]. 
 
• Other materials that are classified by the “registered design professional” as being 
hazardous, based on the character of the material and the processes or operations that are 
conducted in the building or structure [Reference 22]. 
 
Chapters 40 and 42 in the “Life Safety Code” [References 23 and 24] include detailed 
information concerning the construction of exit passageways, suitable types of protection from 
hazards, appropriate fire-alarm systems, permitted utility systems, and allowable travel 
distances. 
 
Emergency-Escape Travel-Distance Requirements 
 
The NFPA “Life Safety Code” provides the following maximum travel-distance limits for 









Maximum Travel Distances, NFPA 101 
HAZARDS OCCUPANCY SPRINKLERS TRAVEL 
DISTANCE 
Special Purpose, Low/Ordinary [Fire] Hazard Yes 400 feet 
Special Purpose, Low/Ordinary [Fire] Hazard No 300 feet 
General Industrial, Low/Ordinary [Fire] Hazard Yes 250 feet 
General Industrial, Low/Ordinary [Fire] Hazard No 200 feet 
High [Explosion] Hazard Yes 75 feet 
High [Explosion] Hazard No [Not Permitted] 
 
As indicated in the preceding Table, automatic sprinkler protection is required in structures 
where high-hazard operations are conducted.  In any process-hazards or due-diligence audits, 
the first focus of a walk-through should be on sprinkler protection and the adequacy of a water 
supplies.  
 




Maximum Travel Distances, IBC 
HAZARDS OCCUPANCY SPRINKLERS TRAVEL 
DISTANCE 
Low [Fire] Hazard, F-2 Yes 400 feet 
Low [Fire] Hazard, F-2 No 300 feet 
Moderate [Fire] Hazard, F-1 Yes 250 feet 
Moderate [Fire] Hazard, F-1 No 200 feet 
High [Toxic] Hazard, H-4 Yes 175 feet 
High [Toxic] Hazard, H-4 No [Not Permitted] 
High [Fire] Hazard, H-3 Yes 150 feet 
High [Fire] Hazard, H-3 No [Not Permitted] 
High [Explosion] Hazard, H-2 Yes 100 feet 
High [Explosion] Hazard, H-2 No [Not Permitted] 
 
Other Aspects of Emergency-Egress Travel Pathways 
 
There are many locations in typical chemical plants where there is only one path for access and 
exit.  This might include the following: 
 
• The upper and/or top levels of open structures; 
• Platforms on fractionating and extraction columns, strippers, tall reactors, and similar 
towers, and the ladders or stairways providing access to such platforms; 
• Stairs, ladders, or walkways giving access to bucket elevators, belt conveyors, and other 
material-conveying systems; 
• Walkways along pipe racks; 
• Platforms at tank-truck and rail-car loading and unloading locations;  
• The top floors, lofts, penthouses, or attics of closed structures,  
 
The NFPA “Life Safety Code” provides the following restrictions on the occupancies of single-
exit locations [Reference 27]: 
 
Table 4 
Single-Exit Restrictions, NFPA 101 
















High [Explosion] Hazard Yes 3 [<200 sq.ft.] 25 feet 
High [Explosion] Hazard No 3 [<200 sq.ft.] 25 feet 
Similarly, the International Building Code has the following limits on the occupancies of single-
exit locations [Reference 28]: 
 
Table 5 
Single-Exit Restrictions, IBC 
HAZARDS OCCUPANCY MAX. NO. OF 
PERSONS 
TRAVEL 
DISTANCE TO EXIT 
Low [Fire] Hazard, F-2 49 75 feet 
Moderate [Fire] Hazard, F-1 49 75 feet 
High [Toxic] Hazard, H-4 10 75 feet 
High [Fire] Hazard, H-3 3 25 feet 
High [Explosion] Hazard, H-2 3 25 feet 
 
Process-safety audits should examine and evaluate the life-safety aspects of these locations, to 
determine if persons at these locations could be exposed to fire, explosion, or toxic-material 
release at lower levels.  In particular, the evaluation should determine the protection that should 
be worn, be carried, or be available at these “dead end” locations.  The minimum protection 
would be an escape respirator, with sufficient capacity to reach safety at ground level.  In some 
locations, it also would be advisable to require the wearing of flame-resistant clothing, if 
exposure to fire could occur.  Further, for some locations, access to “dead-end” areas should be 
limited to shutdown periods, where there would be no pressurized flammable and/or toxic 
liquids and gases that could hinder escape. 
 
Process-safety audits also should examine the escape routes from the most-remote points on a 
floor or platform.  The route should be over solid flooring – rather than open grating – for some 
protection against fire at lower levels [Reference 29].  Measurement of the travel distances from 
the remote points – from drawings or by physical measurement – should be compared with the 
maximum travel distances, as described above. 
 
A likely and frequent consequence of explosion is power failure, with loss of lighting.  A life-
safety audit should include a study of emergency lighting of exit pathways around process 




During process-safety studies or audits, the suitability of interior stairways as accesses to exits 
should be assessed.  Unless an interior stairway is well-isolated from hazardous processes, it 




For the life safety of employees, contractors, and visitors – and particularly for the life safety of 
spill-response teams – the “worst-case” equilibrium concentration above a spill should be 
determined [Reference 31].  This evaluation should be done for every toxic liquid that is 
handled in “significant” quantity at a site. 
 
 
Many toxic liquids and toxic gases have lethal concentrations that typically are characterized by 
LC50 values; that is, the concentrations that would cause fatality to half of the exposed animals 
or individuals, usually for a specified duration of exposure.  Four hours of exposure to the toxic 
fluid [gas or vapor] is typical, but shorter or longer durations are quoted in the references 
[References 32 and 33].  For many fluids and for short exposures – usually less than one hour – 
the product of concentration and duration represents a “dose”.  This is described by the Haber 
equation:  D = Ct  ppm-minutes [Reference 34].  For longer exposures, the Haber equation is 
modified to:  Cnt = K.   
 
A simple relationship between equilibrium concentration and temperature is the Antoine 
equation, with conversion to parts per million by volume [ppm]: 
 
                    C  =  (1,000,000) ( 10 A – [ B / ( T + C ) ] ) / 760      ppm. 
 
Values of the Antoine constants can be found in the literature [Reference 35]. 
 
Wearing inadequate breathing protection in a contaminated atmosphere can be life-threatening.  
To aid in minimizing this hazard, OSHA has issued a table of Assigned Protection Factors: 
 
Table 6 
Assigned Protection Factors 
BREATHING PROTECTION APF 
Air-Purifying [Cartridge] Respirator [APR], 
Demand Mode; Quarter Mask [Nose and Mouth] 
5 
Air-Purifying [Cartridge] Respirator [APR], 
Demand Mode; Half Mask [Nose, Mouth, and Chin] 
10 
Air-Purifying [Cartridge] Respirator [APR], 
Demand Mode; Full Facepiece 
50 
Supplied-Air Respirator [SAR] or SCBA, 
Demand Mode; Half Mask [Nose, Mouth, and Chin] 
10 
Supplied-Air Respirator [SAR] or SCBA, 
Demand Mode; Full Facepiece or Helmet/Hood 
50 
Powered Air-Purifying Respirator [PAPR], 
Positive-Pressure; Half Mask [Nose, Mouth, and Chin] 
50 
Powered Air-Purifying Respirator [PAPR], 
Positive-Pressure; Full Facepiece 
1,000 
Powered Air-Purifying Respirator [PAPR], 
Positive-Pressure; Helmet or Hood [if tested] 
1,000 
Supplied-Air [Airline] Respirator [SAR], 
Positive-Pressure; Half Mask [Nose, Mouth, and Chin] 
50 
Supplied-Air [Airline] Respirator [SAR], 
Positive-Pressure; Full Facepiece 
1,000 
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus [SCBA], 
Positive-Pressure; Full Facepiece 
10,000 
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus [SCBA], 
Positive-Pressure; Helmet or Hood 
10,000 
   
As indicated in this table, high Assigned Protection Factors can only be achieved with full-face 
positive-pressure protection. 
   
Fire and Explosion Control  
 
The primary objective of fire and explosion control is to protect life and property by ensuring 
that concentrations of flammable gases and vapors do not exceed the Lower Flammable Limit 
[LFL] – or the equivalent Lower Explosive Limit [LEL] – and that concentrations of 
combustible dusts do not exceed the Minimum Explosible Concentration [MEC]. 
 
          Flammable Liquids and Gases 
 
The LFL values for flammable gases and vapor vary from about 0.3 percent by volume – for 
high-molecular-weight gases and vapors – to about 2.5 percent by volume, or about a factor of 
eight.  However, on a weight-concentration basis, the range is much narrower – from about 26 
to 76 grams per cubic meter, or a factor of about three, with an average of about 44 grams per 
cubic meter.  Weight concentrations are important when evaluating the combustibility hazards 
of “hybrid” mixtures of flammable gases or vapors with combustible dusts [Reference 36]. 
 
Life safety from flash fire and explosion involving flammable gases and vapors can be 
minimized if sufficient ventilation is provided in enclosed spaces to prevent the accumulation of 
gases and vapors above the LFL.  The vapors for most flammable liquids are much denser than 
air, so floor-level exhaust ventilation should be provided.  This is in contrast to window or wall 
fans that are installed well above floor level.  The recommended exhaust-ventilation rate is quite 
modest, at 1 standard cubic foot per minute per square foot of floor area [Reference 37].  This 
corresponds to an average velocity along the floor of about 1 foot per minute, or about 0.01 mile 
per hour.  For lighter-than-air gases and hot vapors, a similar exhaust-ventilation rate should be 
provided across the ceiling, again to prevent accumulation of hazardous amounts of flammable 
and explosible gases [or light vapors]. 
 
Spills and unintended releases of flammable liquids from sampling points, dispensing stations, 
and drains can be minimized by providing “dead man” self-closing valves at these locations 
[Reference 38].  Thus, unexpected flows or spark-ignition of the flowing material would be 
stopped when the valve handled is released.  Similarly, pump transfers of flammable liquids 
into open containers should be controlled with a “dead man” switch, such that releasing the 
switch or removing pressure from a pushbutton would stop the flow.  
 
The vapor concentrations above flammable-liquid spills can be greatly reduced by covering the 
spill with foam [Reference 39] or a non-combustible granular material, such as vermiculite, 
amorphous mineral silicates [such as “Sorb-All”], and “kitty litters” based on baking soda.  
Thus, the first action of an emergency response team would be to cover the spill to reduce the 
likelihood of ignition of the vapors. 
 
        Combustible Dusts [and Aerosols and Mists] 
 
The MEC values for combustible dusts [and aerosols and mists] range from about 15 grams per 
cubic meter to about 60 grams per cubic meter.  Thus, on a weight-concentration basis, the 
lower combustion limits for gases, vapors, aerosols, mists, and dusts [Reference 40] are quite 
similar.  
 
For combustible dusts, floor-level exhaust ventilation is not very effective in preventing the 
accumulation of dusts, since the densities of dust particles typically are three orders of 
magnitude greater than the density of air. Thus, local exhaust ventilation should be provided to 
minimize the size and density of dust clouds at locations where such clouds could exist 
[Reference 41].  This would include powder-bagging stations, powder-recovery operations, dust 
removal from dust collectors, ductwork cleaning, and similar activities where dense clouds of 
dust could occur.  For guidance concerning the dust-combustion hazard, the “rule of thumb” is 
pertinent:  if the thumb can be seen at the end of the outstretched arm, the dust-cloud density is 
likely to be too low to allow propagation of combustion [Reference 42].  Conversely, 
extremely-poor visibility is an indication of a dust-explosion hazard. 
   
Accumulations of combustible dusts should be prevented, particularly on elevated surfaces, to 
minimize the likelihood of flash fires and primary and secondary explosions [Reference 43].  
The elevated surfaces would include roof-support structures, ductwork, piping, light fixtures, 
and process equipment.  Guidance that is provided in the NFPA publications includes the 
following [References 44 and 45]: 
Table 7 
Housekeeping Guidelines 
Dust-Layer Depth Frequency Housekeeping 
Less than 1 mm 
[<1/32”] 
Infrequent Clean to maintain < 1 mm and to 
ensure surface colors are discernible 
1/32” to 1/8” Infrequent Clean up during the same shift 
More than 1/8” Two or three times per year Immediately shut down and clean 
The above guidance is primarily for electrically-unclassified areas.  If the area is classified 
Class II, Division 1 or Division 2, then greater cleaning intervals would be permissible. 
 
It is also important that the concentration of combustible dusts be kept below the MEC in 
process equipment, unless the concentration of oxygen is reduced by inerting [with nitrogen, for 
example; Reference 46].  If high velocities are maintained in exhaust-ventilation systems – 
above 4,000 feet per minute [20 meters per second], for example [Reference 47] – this usually 





Members of a site’s Emergency-Response Team [ER Team] are the employees that are most-
likely to be exposed to toxic materials, in providing life-safety for other employees, contractors, 
and visitors.  Although the frequency of such exposures might be very low, the ER Team must 
be well-prepared for almost every eventuality. 
 
The minimum protection for the life safety of members of the ER Team would be the following: 
 
• Body protection – flame-resistant and full-coverage outer clothing, for protection against 
flash fire and sprays of liquid. 
• Eye protection – goggles and/or face shield, for protection against liquid sprays, flash 
fire, and hazards during access to – or escape from – damaged structures. 
• Head protection – hard hat or helmet, for protection from head-bumping hazards and 
falling debris. 
• Hand protection – heat-resistant gloves, with long cuffs 
• Foot protection – hard-toe, steel-footplate, and slip-resistant safety shoes or boots, for 
protection against spilled liquids and dusts and against penetrating objects in access and exit 
pathways. 
• Breathing protection – for protection against combustion gases, toxic gases and vapors, 
and toxic or nuisance dusts. 
 
The equipment that should be provided for the ER Team would include some or all of the 
following: 
 
• Fire extinguishers: A [ordinary combustibles], B [flammable liquids], 
            C [non-conductive], and D [metals]. 
• Spill-control equipment:  spill-covering non-combustible granules 
            [“Spill-X” extinguisher-type applicators; absorbent “pigs”; etc.]    
• Drain covers 
• Rescue equipment: ropes, stretchers, spineboard, gurneys, hoists. 
• Site maps, showing stairways, elevators, safety showers, wheeled extinguishers. 
• Water hoses 
• Portable battery-operated lights, flash lights    
• Defibrillator, oxygen supply and mask 
• First-aid kit, splints, blankets 
• A cart or vehicle-pulled wagon to contain the spill-control and rescue equipment, 
            and the personal protective equipment for the ER Team members. 
 
Special training for the members of the ER Team would be needed, to recognize hazards to 
their own life safety, including entry into confined spaces, exposure to high voltages, and 
exposure to toxic and flammable gases, vapors, and dusts.  Members of the ER Team must also 
be able to recognize when a situation is “beyond control” and when it is essential for them to 
escape from the uncontrollable hazards. 
 
Formal Analysis of Operations for Life-Safety Hazards 
 
          Process Hazards Analysis, or Risk Analysis 
 
There are several methods that are in current use for analysis of processes for hazards, and the 
“most popular” is the Hazard and Operability [HAZOP] method.  Whichever method is used, it 
is important that the analysis not be limited to a “conference-room” or “ivory-tower” study of 
Piping and Instrument Diagrams [P&IDs] or a review of Standard Operating Procedures 
[SOPs].  It certainly is important to ensure that control systems are designed to contend with 
process upsets [through a P&ID study], and that operators are properly trained in process 
control [through review of SOPs.  However, these studies should be accompanied by first-hand 
study of the following: 
 
• Evaluate the life-safety of operators, mechanics, contractors, and visitors in operating 
areas, to ensure that they have ready access to exits. 
  
• Study the process equipment to ensure that overpressure protection has been properly 
installed, as shown in P&IDs, to prevent rupture. 
 
• Discuss the Operating Procedures with operating personnel, supervisors, and process 
engineers, to determine if they all are comfortable with the process and the procedures that they 
are required to follow. 
 
The OSHA “Process Safety Management” standard requires Material Balances and Energy 
Balances – which are easily and rather-accurately calculable.  However, it is perhaps more 
important that a “Power Balance” be developed, to show how the power [joules per second, or 
watts per milliliter [Reference 48] for an exothermic reaction is controlled, or how the power 
delivered to an endothermic reaction is adequately controlled.  The power developed by an 
exothermic reaction cannot be calculated and must be determined by test, using equipment such 
as the “RC1” which allows confident scale-up. 
 
 Assistance by a “third-party” process-safety specialist often can provide a “fresh set of eyes”, 




          Job Safety Analysis 
 
There are many operations – in addition to the operation of chemical processes – where there 
are life-safety hazards.  They include process-vessel entry [confined-space entry], process-
equipment lockout [such as valves at pumps], removal of combustible dust from ductwork, 
cleanup of flammable-liquid spillage, truck loading and unloading, flexible-hose transfers of 
toxic liquids and gases, lift-truck operations, and shrink-wrapping.  The purpose of Job Safety 
Analysis is to ascertain whether or not the procedures are sufficient to provide life-safety and to 
see if the practices match the procedures.  When the practices do not match the procedures, this 
indicates that the site’s Management of Change procedure is ineffective and needs attention, in 
application and authorizations. 
 
          “Near-Miss” Reporting 
 
“Near-Misses” sometimes are events that could have been hazardous to health or life, except 
that one or more Layers of Protection functioned properly to prevent escalation of the event.  
Reporting of such “Near-Misses” is important – as “lessons to be learned” – to ensure that 
appropriate engineering or administrative controls are put in place to prevent recurrence.  Thus, 
reporting of “Near-Misses” should be encouraged, even to the point of encouraging anonymous 
reporting of such events.   Further, investigation of “Near-Misses” is as important as 
investigation of process incidents, particularly if a hazard to life might be involved.  
 
          Leading Indicators 
 
In a manner similar to the treatment of “Near-Misses”, a site should establish appropriate 
leading indicators, to aid in determining how possibly-limited resources should be allocated.  Of 
several types of leading indicators, perhaps the most-important is “trends” in safety 
performance.  This would include the frequency of serious injuries – particularly process-related 
injuries – and the frequency of serious process upsets.  The latter would include the frequency 
of releases from relief valves and explosion vents, frequency of interlock or manual emergency 
shutdowns of processes, frequency of spills of flammable liquids or releases of combustible 




Chemical plants can have a wide variety of life-safety hazards.  Pertinent Codes and Standards 
provide good guidance concerning the avoidance and mitigation of such hazards. A 
comprehensive Process Hazards Analysis or Risk Assessment can aid in identifying hazards, 
and members of the PHA or RA Team should be expected to propose improvements to 
minimize the life-safety hazards.  The PHA or RA should include a thorough field study of the 
process equipment and, particularly, how employees, contractors, and visitors would escape to a 
safe location if a fire, explosion, or toxic release were to occur. 
 
There are several types of life-hazard warnings that should be reported, investigated, and 
corrected, including “Near-Misses” and trends in safety performance.  With well-directed 
efforts to identify and correct life-safety hazards, the “General Duty” responsibility for 
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